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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. UNITED STTES v NEw MEXIcO-AFFIRMED
In United Stales v. New Mexi'co,' the Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed the Tenth Circuit's decision 2 that three Department of Energy
(DOE)3 contractors and their suppliers were subject to state taxes. The
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the imposition of these state taxes
because the contractors could "be considered entities independent of the
United States."'4 The Court's decision clarified the extension of federal im-
munity from state tax burdens to federal contractors.5
The three contractors, Sandia Corp. (Sandia), Zia Co. (Zia), and Los
Alamos Constructors, Inc. (LACI), had separate contracts with DOE to pro-
vide services at federally-owned laboratories in New Mexico.6 In 1975, the
United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment on behalf of these three private
corporations. 7 Specifically, the United States sought clarification as to
whether these contractors must pay the following taxes: 1) the compensating
use tax8 on property purchased by the contractors outside of the state but
used in New Mexico; and 2) the gross receipts tax9 on federal funds ad-
vanced to the contractors to pay creditors and employees. In addition, the
United States wanted to clarify whether vendors selling property to these
contractors must pay New Mexico's gross receipts tax on such sales. 10
1. 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
2. United States v. New Mexico, 624 F.2d III (10th Cir. 1980), aff', 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
3. This agency was formerly called the Atomic Energy Commission. 455 U.S. at 722-23.
4. d. at 738-44.
5. Id. at 733-44.
6. Sandia's contract authorized Sandia's management of the government-owned Sandia
Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico as well as engagement in federally-sponsored re-
search. Id. at 723. Zia's contract governed its responsibilities concerning "management, main-
tenance, and related functions at the [gjovernment's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory." Id. at
724. LACI's contract limited its operations to "construction and repair work at the Los Alamos
facility." Id.
7. Id. at 728; 624 F.2d at 113.
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-7 (1978 & Supp. 1982)).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-4 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-4 (1978 & Supp. 1982)).
10. See 455 U.S. at 728, 741-43. The Court used the phrase "sales tax" in discussing this
issue. Id. at 741-43.
An analysis of the structure of the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act is necessary
for a more technical understanding of the tax issues involved. Section 72-16A-4 imposes an
excise tax on "gross receipts" of "any person engaging in business in New Mexico." N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 72-16A-4 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4 (1978 &
Supp. 1982)). Section 72-16A-7 imposes an excise tax for the privilege of "using" both property
and services in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current ver-
sion at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (1978 & Supp. 1982)). Section 72-16A-12.1 provides that "re-
ceipts" of the United States, its agencies, and its instrumentalities are "exempted" from the
gross receipts tax. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-12.1 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-13 (1978)). Similarly, § 72-16A-12.2 provides that the "use of property
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The United States claimed that the contractors and their suppliers were
consz-'utt'onally immune from state taxation.'" The district court agreed,1
2
but the Tenth Circuit reversed.' 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
consider the seemingly intractable problems posed by [s]tate taxation of fed-
eral contractors." 14
Beginning with M'Culloch v. Maryland,1'5 the Court reviewed its decisions
involving the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation. According
to the Court, MCulloch relied on the general notion of federal supremacy to
invalidate Maryland's tax on the Second Bank of the United States.' 6 Cases
subsequent to M'Culloch, however, have not been consistently decided.'
7
Thus, the Court decided to "return to the underlying constitutional princi-
ple" of federal supremacy to decide this and future cases. 18
The rule announced by the Court is that "tax immunity is appropriate
in only one circumstance: where the levy falls on the United States itself, or
on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that
the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as
the activity being taxed is concerned."' Thus, the Court went beyond re-
quiring merely an agency relationship.20 Any deviation from this narrow
constitutional limit must expressly be made by Congress.
2' 1
In determining whether the compensating use tax applied to the con-
tractors, the Court emphasized that the contractors were privately owned
by the United States, its agencies, and its instrumentalities are "exempted" from the compensat-
ing tax. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-12.2 (Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STFAT. ANN.
§ 7-9-14 (1978)). In contrast, § 72-16A-14.9 provides that "/r/ecetpts from sd/hg tangible per-
sonal property . . . to the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof. . . may be
deducted from gross receipts." N.M. SlTrT. ANN. § 72-16A-14.9 (Supp. 1976-77) (current version
at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54 (1978)) (emphasis added).
The district court correctly identified the tax issue concerning the suppliers as one involv-
ing "the deduction provision" of the gross receipts tax. United States v. New Mexico, 455 F.
Supp. 993, 995 (D. N.M. 1978), rev d, 624 F.2d I 11 (10th Cir. 1980), qft'd, 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
The Tenth Circuit also identified this issue as concerning a "tax deduction." 624 F.2d at 114.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court referred to a "sales tax" and failed to distinguish
between exemptions and deductions, this lack of technical accuracy does not affect the outcome
of the case. The constitutional issues depend on the activities of the contractors. See 455 U.S. at
733-44.
11. Id. at .728. The United States also claimed that it must, "as a matter of constitutional
law, be permitted to intervene in any New Mexico administrative proceeding involving the
tax status of the three corporations." 624 F.2d at 113. The Tenth Circuit agreed. Id. at 121.
This issue was not discussed, however, in the Supreme Court's decision. See 455 U.S. at 720.
12. 455 F. Supp. 993 (D. N.M. 1978).
13. 624 F.2d Ill (10th Cir. 1980).
14. 455 U.S. at 730.
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) ("ITihe power to tax involves the power to destroy.").
16. 455 U.S. at 730-31.
17. Id. at 730-33. The Court stated that this field of law has been "one that has been
marked from the beginning by inconsistent decisions and excessively, delicate distinctions." Id.
at 730.
18. Id. at 733.
19. Id. at 735.
20. Id. at 736. Prior cases discussing agency relationships included: United States v. Boyd,
378 U.S. 39 (1964); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); Alabama v.
King & Boozer, 314 U.S. I (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). These
cases, however, "failled] to speak with one voice on the relevance of traditional agency rules in
determining the tax-immunity status of federal contractors." 455 U.S. at 732-33.
21. Id. at 737.
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corporations with specially created and closely limited governmental rela-
tionships.22 Furthermore, the governmental relationships were established
to make a profit. 23 The fact that the property being used was for the govern-
ment's benefit was irrelevant 24 since the government did not have an owner-
ship interest.
25
Having determined that the contractors were independent taxable enti-
ties for purposes of the use tax, the Court concluded that the contractors
were also subject to the gross receipts tax on the funds advanced by the
United States. 26 Furthermore, the Court concluded, "[i]f receipt of ad-
vanced funding is coextensive with status as a federal instrumentality, virtu-
ally every federal contractor is, or could easily become, immune from state
taxation.
'2 7
Finally, the Court examined whether vendors selling supplies to the
contractors must pay gross receipts on the proceeds of such sales. The Court
called this issue "a more complex problem . . . [for] it is arguable that an
entity serving as a federal procurement agent can be so closely associated
with the Government, and so lack an independent role in the purchase, as to
make the sale . . . a sale to the United States."'28 The Court emphasized,
however, that the contractors here made purchases in their own names with-
out prior governmental approval for each purchase. Also, the contractors
did not inform the suppliers that the government had an independent inter-
est in the purchase of the property. Furthermore, the government dis-
claimed any intention of designating the contractors as purchasing agents.
2 9
The fact that title passed directly from the suppliers to the government was
not controlling, "so long as the purchasing entity in this role as a purchaser is
sufficiently distinct from the Government."'30 Thus, because the contractors
were independent entities, the vendors could not escape the gross receipts tax
on the proceeds from sales to the contractors.
3i
It is clear that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to attempt to clar-
ify state taxation of federal contractors. It remains to be seen, however, if
this opinion will send American courts "in an entirely unwavering line
' ' : '-
with future decisions.
Sharon K Tarr
22. Id. at 740.
23. Id. at 739.
24. Id. See also United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
25. 455 U.S. at 740. See also First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339.
354 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. 455 U.S. at 741.
27. Id. The Court stated in its discussion of the advanced funds issue that "incurring obli-
gations to achieve contractual ends is not significantly different from using property for the
same purposes." Id. It is not clear what this statement means, especially in light of the Tenth
Circuit's discussion that advanced funding had surface appearances of giving the contractors
the power to pledge the credit of the United States. 624 F.2d at 119.
28. 455 U.S. at 741-42.
29. Id. at 743.
30. Id. See also Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 13 (1941).
31. 455 U.S. at 743.
32. Id. at 732.
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II. UNITED STATES V SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK-AFFIRMED
Urnted States v. Securty Industrial Bank ' was a consolidation of seven cases
from the United States Bankruptcy Courts for the districts of Kansas and
Colorado.2 In each case creditors had acquired valid liens on personal prop-
erty of the debtor. The debtor claimed that the liens could be avoided under
the exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 3 (Reform Act) and
the creditors claimed that their liens were created before the Reform Act
became effective and were therefore not subject to discharge. 4 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals5 affirmed the Bankruptcy Court decisions 6 uphold-
ing the creditors' liens. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.
7
A. Background
The Reform Act represents the first major change in the bankruptcy
laws in over forty years. Under the new Act, the debtor is allowed certain
exemptions which permit him to retain property after discharge is granted.'
Specifically, section 5229 allows the debtor to exempt certain household
items and to avoid the fixing of a non-possessory, non-purchase money secur-
ity interest in some of those items.
In Securiy Industrial Bank, each creditor had acquired a non-possessory,
non-purchase money security interest prior to the Reform Act's effective date
1. 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982), afg, Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir.
1981).
2. Three cases were consolidated at the Bankruptcy Courts. The remaining four cases
were then appealed directly to the Tenth Circuit where they were consolidated. The seven cases
were: Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. 293 (D. Colo. 1980) (Stevens v. Liberty Loan
Corp. was consolidated with Jackson in the Bankruptcy Court); Rodrock v. Security Indus.
Bank, 3 Bankr. 629 (D. Colo. 1980) (Krenzel v. Security Indus. Bank was consolidated with
Rodrock in the Bankruptcy Court); Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr. 365 (D. Colo. 1980);
Schulte v. Beneficial Fin. of Kan., Inc., No. 79-11745 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 27, 1980) (Hunter v.
Beneficial Fin. of Kan., Inc., was consolidated with Schulte in the Bankruptcy Court).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980)).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 409.
5. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982).
6. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed all judgments, it did not affirm
on the grounds used in the two Kansas cases.
7. 103 S. Ct. 402 (1982). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Blackmun concurred, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Prior to this decision, there was
general disarray in the lower courts. Compare Paden v. G.E.C.C. Consumer Discount Co., 10
Bankr. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1981) and Campbell v. Afco Fin. Serv. Co., 8 Bankr. 425 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(holding retroactive application constitutional) with Baker v. GFC Corp., 11 Bankr. 125 (W.D.
Mo. 1981) and Woods v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 9 Bankr. 325 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding retro-
active application unconstitutional).
8. The federal exemptions were designed to permit individual debtors to enjoy a "fresh
start" after bankruptcy. Formerly, exemptions were granted by each state's law and were ex-
cluded ab initio from the bankruptcy estate. Federal bankruptcy courts did not have jurisdiction
to resolve disputes concerning exempt assets. If a state court upheld a lien on assets that were
otherwise exempt, repossession could leave the debtor without assets for a fresh start. The Re-
form Act now includes exempt property ah initio in the estate and protects it from antecedent
claims once exempted. Note, Lien Avoidance Under § 522() of the Bankruptcy Code.- Is Retrospective
Application Constitutional?, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 615 (1981).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. IV 1980).
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of October 1, 1979.'0 The debtors filed for bankruptcy after the effective
date and sought to avoid the liens under section 522(0.11 The question
presented in each case was whether section 522(f) should be retroactively
applied, and if so, whether such a retroactive application would violate the
Constitution.
B. The Constitutional Question
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 522 was intended
to be retroactively applied,1 2 and therefore, squarely faced the constitutional
question. In deciding this issue, the Tenth Circuit held that retroactive ap-
plication of section 522 would constitute a "taking" of the creditors' vested
rights in the debtor's property in violation of the fifth amendment.1 3
The Tenth Circuit was influenced by Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radfo d. 14 In Radford, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional under
the fifth amendment, an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which allowed a
defaulting farm property mortgagor to retain ownership and possession of
the farm, thereby divesting the mortgagee of its property rights in the secur-
ity.1 5 Despite a later Supreme Court decision casting doubt on the vitality
of Radford, 16 the Tenth Circuit applied the case's fundamental premise:
Congress may not completely take a creditor's rights and property for the
benefit of a debtor.1
7
The Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional issue was similar to
the Tenth Circuit's. The Supreme Court first recognized the distinction be-
tween property rights and contractual rights.t 8 Although Congress has the
constitutional authority to retroactively impair contractual obligations,t 9
additional difficulty arises when Congress seeks to impair a property interest.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 409.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1980) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemp-
tion to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section,
if such lien is
(I) a judicial lien; or
(2) a non-possessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any
(A) Household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
12. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982).
13. 642 F.2d at 1196. The fifth amendment provides that: "No person shall be . . .de-
prived of . . .property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken . . .
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
15. Id. at 602.
16. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 443 (1937),
where the Court upheld a law that merely postponed a mortgagee's right to foreclose on a
mortgagor's property upon default.
17. Additionally, the Court noted that the situation in Radord was not even as extreme as
the situation presented in Security Indusnrat Bank. In Radford, the mortgagee still realized some
value for his mortgage interest. 642 F.2d at 1197 n.4.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 410.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
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The creditors' interests in this case were property rights20 and Congress may
not, even under its bankruptcy powers, 2 1 impair such an interest without
violating the fifth amendment.
22
Unlike the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the Supreme
Court used the above discussion to point out the prudence of avoiding the
constitutional issue and proceeded to decide the case on statutory grounds.
23
This, the Court pointed out, was an application of the "cardinal principle"
that if possible a statute should be construed in order to avoid constitutional
questions.24 The result, however, was the same as that reached by the Tenth
Circuit.
C. Retroactivity--The Statutory Question
As noted above, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, before reaching
the constitutional question, held that section 522 was intended to be retroac-
tively applied.25 This decision was based on legislative history and statutory
construction. The effective date of the Reform Act was October 1, 1979.26
The Reform Act provided that as of that date the former Bankruptcy Act
was repealed, 27 and all proceedings initiated on or after that date were to be
governed by the new Act. 28 In a case filed on or after October 1, 1979, if the
Reform Act does not apply to a creditors' interests which came into existence
prior to October 1, 1979, then there would be no bankruptcy law governing
their interests at all. The Tenth Circuit held that such a "statutory gap" was
not intended by Congress.
29
The Supreme Court acknowledged this argument but thought the anal-
ysis inadequate. The Court stated that the liens exist under state law inde-
pendently of the Reform Act. Thus, it is not true that there would be no law
governing liens perfected prior to October 1, 1979.
30
The Court then relied on legislative history to hold that section 522(f)
was intended to be prospectively applied. 3 1 It was pointed out that prelimi-
20. The government, arguing in favor of retroactive application of § 522, contended that
the creditors' rights in the debtor's property were so insubstantial that it did not amount to a
full property interest. Justice Rehnquist stated that the decisions in Radford and Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), militated against such a proposition. 103 S. Ct. at 411.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. The Court also pointed out that a taking under the fifth amendment may involve more
than the government acquiring property for itself. 103 S. Ct. at 412.
23. "The foregoing discussion satisfies us that there is substantial doubt whether the retro-
active destruction of the appellees' liens, in these cases comports with the fifth amendment. We
now consider whether, as a matter of statutory construction, § 522(0(2) must necessarily be
applied in that manner." Id.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 642 F.2d at 1196. Bankruptcy Court Judge Glen E. Keller, Jr., in a well-reasoned
opinion, reiected "as a mere play on words," an argument by the United States that § 522(l)
would not operate retroactively if applied to pre-enactment security interests because it simply
acts prospectively on previously acquired security interests. Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr.
635, 637 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 412-13.
31. Id. at 414 (citing H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 10-103(a) (1975), reprinted in Bank-
[Vol. 60:2
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nary drafts of the savings clause expressly required retroactive application.
32
During the House hearings in 1976, however, a consultant to the Bankruptcy
Commission suggested certain exceptions to retroactive application or a
"separability clause" to avoid and lessen the impact of constitutional chal-
lenges to the Act. 33 Although the consultant raised no significant constitu-
tional arguments against retroactive application of federal exemptions,3 4 the
Court reasoned that Congress, by dropping the express language requiring
retroactivity, had supplied some evidence of its intent to have the Act ap-
plied prospectively.
35
Further, the Court pointed out the basic principle that statutes are pre-
sumed to operate prospectively only.3 6 This principle applies to bankruptcy
statutes affecting property rights.37 Considering the legislative intent the
Court found favoring prospective application, it was unwilling to construe
section 522(f) as an exception to this general rule.
D. Consequences
The Supreme Court's holding undoubtedly has the same result as the
Tenth Circuit's holding-it maintains creditors pre-Reform Act liens. How-
ever, in its overzealous desire to avoid the constitutional question, the Court
provides a classic example of result-oriented analysis. By resting its decision
on the failure of Congress to adopt express language requiring retroactivity 38
it is evident that many possible indications of congressional intent were not
considered.
First, numerous substantive and editing changes were made by the con-
gressional staff, including the collection of all transition provisions in a sepa-
rate title.39 The express language of the preliminary drafts to which Justice
Rehnquist makes reference may have been altered for the sake of clarity,
brevity, and organization, rather than deleted to demonstrate intent.4 °
Second, many constitutional problems concerning retroactivity of the
particular provisions were addressed by rewriting those particular provi-
sions41 and by evincing intent favoring separability. 4 2 Because a congres-
sional choice to address a matter in one part of the statute and not in
rupicy Act Revision: Hearings on I.R. 31/& 32 before the Subcomm. on Civil& Constitutional Rights of/he
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), n.4 app., at 320-21)) [hereinafter Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision].
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra note 31, at 2066-67 (statement of William
Plumb, Jr.)).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also I COLLIER ON BANKRUiTCY 7.12 (15th Ed. 1982); Note, supra note 8, at
624.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 413.
37. Id. (citing Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 367 (1914)).
38. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
39. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 944 (1979).
40. Congress worked on the proposed legislation for two years, during which time countless
drafting changes were made. Id. at 945-57.
41. The consultant expressed concern over § 4-405(b), which eliminated state recognized
priorities in marital property interest for creditors. Note, supra note 8, at 624.
42. Id. at 625.
19831
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another is presumed to be intentional, 43 the alteration of some substantive
provisions precludes the inference of a general prohibition against
retroactivity.
Finally, even after the deletion of the express language, statements
made on the floor of the House and Senate, 44 as well as in the House report,
evidenced clear congressional intent to apply the Act retroactively. Thus,
the Court has virtually ignored the overwhelming evidence that Congress
intended section 522 to be applied retroactively. 45 Although the Court's de-
sire to avoid the constitutional question is admirable,46 it must not selec-
tively review legislative history. If the Court can ignore clear statements of
congressional intent to obtain a satisfactory outcome, its power will be ex-
panded immeasurably.
Alan David Sweetbaum
III. ESPINOSA V RUSK-AFFIRMED
In Espinosa v. Rusk I the Supreme Court, by memorandum opinion, af-
firmed a Tenth Circuit decision2 which held that an ordinance regulating
solicitation by charitable organizations had been unconstitutionally ap-
plied. 3 The case involved the annual fund drive of the Seventh Day Advent-
ist Church. An Albuquerque ordinance regulated and required licensing of
solicitation by charitable groups, but provided exemptions for religious
groups if the solicitation was for "evangelical, missionary or religious but not
secular purposes."'4 Some of the money raised was used to provide food,
clothing, and shelter to those in need.5 Because the ordinance defines secu-
lar as "relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing food, cloth-
ing and counseling," the city determined that the church's fund drive
43. United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. Note, supra note 8, at 625.
45. The concurring opinion also makes reference to this point. 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). The emphasis of Blackmun's concurring opinion is twofold: 1) Were
there no authority to control the case, the constitutional issue should be addressed and resolved
in favor of the debtor, but 2) under the authority of Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 367 (1914), the
bankruptcy laws must be construed so as to confine their effect to property rights established
after they were passed.
46. This decision could conceivably pose problems for Congress when it responds to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,
102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). Northern Pipeline essentially held that Congress had unconstitutionally
granted Article III powers to the Bankruptcy Courts, which were held to be Article I courts.
Congress must now enact legislation curing this defect. In order to avoid challenges to Bank-
ruptcy Court actions taken prior to this congressional enactment, the legislation must necessar-
ily be retroactive. In light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret legislation in this
manner, Congress must take steps to clearo show that retroactive application was intended.
1. 102 S.Ct. 2025 (1982), afg, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), atd, 102 S. Ct. 2025 (1982).
3. 634 F.2d at 478.
4. Id. at 479.
5. Id at 479 n.1.
[Vol. 60:2
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included secular activities. Therefore the church was required to comply
with the city's ordinance. Compliance included filing an application, paying
a twenty-five dollars fee, providing details of the fund drive, and making
financial disclosures. The church challenged the constitutionality of the
city's action by filing suit for injunctive relief.6 The Tenth Circuit court
upheld the trial court's decision to enjoin permanently the city from enforc-
ing the ordinance against the church, 7 citing the holding of the landmark
first amendment case of Cantwell v. Connecticut .8
In Cantwell the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of several
Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting funds without a license. A statute allowed
a licensing official to determine who would be permitted to engage in solici-
tation based on hir view of what constitutes a "religious cause." The offi-
cials' decision as to whether a cause was religious was viewed itself as a
religious test. The statute requiring this test was therefore found to be a
denial of liberty protected by the first amendment and included in the liber-
ties protected under the fourteenth amendment.9
The city of Albuquerque argued that its ordinance, unlike the one in
Cantwell, does not result in a prohibition of the right to solicit but merely
imposes regulations to prevent fraud in the solicitation of funds.' 0 More-
over, it was argued the ordinance did not require a determination as to what
was religious as did the statute in Cantwell."
Rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit stated: "The setting up of a
city agency to make distinctions as to that which is religious and that which
is secular so as to subject the latter to regulation is necessarily a suspect ef-
fort.' 12 As in Cantwell, the officials in Esp'nosa were called upon to ascertain
and determine whether the proposed solicitations were for religious pur-
poses. This type of discretion vested in an official was found to violate the
principles of the free exercise of religion. 13 It is the very attempt at defining
"religious" and "secular" which the courts find objectionable, not just that
an ordinance might express an anti-religious object.
14
Judge Barrett dissented, stating that the Supreme Court has recognized
that a certain amount of entanglement between church and state is inevita-
ble.' 5 This issue has been addressed in a series of cases involving the estab-
lishment clause, and Judge Barrett believed that the free exercise issue in
Espinosa deserved a similar approach. Judge Barrett would pose the issue as:
"Does the Albuquerque ordinance challenged here impose an undue, excessive
restraint upon the Seventh Day Adventist Church's religious activity. . . by
requiring a prior application for a permit to solicit for funds intended for
6. Id. at 479.
7. Id at 480.
8. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In this decision the Court held the free exercise clause applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.






15. 634 F.2d at 482 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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'secular activities?' ",16 He thought the ordinance constitutional because the
city's interest in protecting the community from fraudulent solicitations by
regulating "activities overwhelmingly secular in nature" was not an onerous
burden on the free exercise of religious organizations.1
7
Marissa Richker
16. Id. at 483 (emphasis in original).
17. Id
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